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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NELDEN C. NIELSEN
and
MARY Y. NIELSEN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 960088 CA
Argument Priority (15)

vs.
PHILIP WARREN,
Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by assignment
from the Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that plaintiffs' action was "not

properly founded on contract"?
2.

Did the trial court err in holding that Utah Code Ann §78-12-44 did

not apply to plaintiffs' action despite two written acknowledgments of defendant's
debt to plaintiffs?

1

The standard of review for both issues is that this court need accord no
deference to the lower court's said holdings because they were both conclusions of
law. Kelson v. Salt Lake County. 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or
promise to pay. In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or
interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be
brought

within

the

period

prescribed for

the

same after

such

payment,

acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing,
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the
provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground
of defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-108 Payable on demand.
Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and
those in which no time for payment is stated.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal and judgment entered on or
about September 20, 1995, in the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
State of Utah, by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, ruling that promissory notes
obtained by plaintiffs to validate a tax write-off and "to avoid any improper inquiry by
the IRS as to the validity of the $20,000 bad debt write-off" were void and
unenforceable because such improper purpose "would invalidate the promissory
notes." (Tr. 395-396). Consequently, the court granted leave to plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment because the defendant
owed plaintiffs only the amount of the sums received from plaintiffs less the amount
of tax benefits obtained by plaintiffs from their bad debt write-off.

(Tr. 396-397).

Subsequently, the court dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint on the grounds that
the cause of action was not founded upon contract, but equitable in nature, either
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, and was therefore barred by the four year
statute of limitations, §78-12-25, Utah Code Ann. Attorney fees and costs were
awarded to defendant.

Appellants seek to have the court's order and judgment

reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant orally requested a $13,000 loan from plaintiffs on April 14,
1988, which request was increased to $20,000 the next day in order for defendant
3

to meet expenses of publishing his advertising paper. Plaintiffs advised defendant that
they didn't have that much money and would have to borrow the money in order to
make such a loan. (Tr. 283-287, 316-317). The defendant's response to which was
that he would pay the same interest that the plaintiffs had to pay for the enabling
loan. (Tr. 289-290, 316-317). Consequently, on April 15, 1988, plaintiffs increased
their existing loan with Zions Bank to $24,000 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1), from the
proceeds of which they issued two checks to defendant, one for $13,000 and one for
$7,000, both dated April 15, 1988, both indicating payment "For paper", and both
endorsed by defendant. (Exhibits 2 and 3).
Previous business loans made by plaintiffs to defendant for his business
had been repaid within a very short period of time (Tr. 2 8 1 , 282); however, this
$20,000 loan remained unpaid for nearly two years, requiring plaintiffs to pay in full
the funds borrowed from Zion's Bank. (Tr. 287, 310-311).
In 1989 plaintiffs incurred a substantial capital gain from the sale of their
Sacramento publishing business. In 1990, to offset a small portion of that gain,
plaintiffs were advised by their CPA to claim the unpaid loan as a loss or bad debt
which they did in their 1989 tax return, filed on or about August 30, 1990.
(Defendant's Exhibit 9).
They were also advised by their CPA that it would be wise to obtain a
signed note from defendant evidencing the debt. (Tr. 290, 320).
4

Consequently,

plaintiff, Mary Y. Nielsen, prepared two promissory notes reflecting the oral loan
agreement which was made when the two checks were previously delivered to
defendant in 1988. The amounts and the dates of the notes were left blank because
Mary had not located the checks when she prepared the notes on or about March 3 1 ,
1990. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5). The date of the checks "April 15, 1988","was
important to Mary and the defendant for proper interest accrual. (Tr. 289-290). Both
notes were payable on demand because there was no payment date and the words
"On demand" appeared twice on both notes. Demand for payment was expressly
waived in the printed portion of both notes. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5).
After defendant had separated from plaintiffs' daughter, early in March
of 1990, (Tr. 363), and after plaintiffs had filed their 1989 tax return, March 30,
1990, plaintiffs, accompanied by defendant's estranged wife, presented the notes to
defendant for his signature. (Tr. 290, 372-373). Defendant signed the notes with the
handwritten amounts placed on them by Mary (Tr. 369), although he later denied that
the interest rate and the words "On demand" were typed on the notes when he
signed them. (Tr. 364-366). There was also conflict in the testimony as to the exact
time of signing; however, defendant did admit that his signing of the notes could have
been in 1990. (Tr. 373).
Plaintiff, Mary Y. Nielsen, testified that she later added to each note the
date of the checks, "4/15/88", for the purpose of proper interest accrual. She also
5

testified that she explained to defendant the missing dates when he signed the notes.
(Tr. 290). She did not know the date of the checks until she later obtained copies of
the cancelled checks from Zion's Bank. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 3). Her testimony
was that all other handwritten and typed additions to the original printed form notes
had been placed thereon prior to defendant's signing said notes. (Tr. 2 9 1 , 321). She
also testified that subsequent to defendant's signing the notes, an attorney for
plaintiffs' daughter, during her divorce proceeding against defendant, added to a copy
of the $13,000 note the names of plaintiffs, their residence and the typed words
"Thirteen thousand—." (Tr. 298-299). No such additions were ever made to the
original note. Mary testified that the only addition to the notes was her adding the
date of the two previously negotiated checks endorsed only by defendant.
Following the execution of the promissory notes by defendant, he and
his wife were involved in a divorce proceeding during which plaintiffs provided copies
of the two promissory notes to defendant's attorney, with the payee inserted on the
$13,000 note copy.

(Tr. 298, 299, 327, 329).

Also, Mary testified that she

provided defendant's divorce attorney a copy of plaintiffs' 1988 Zions Bank Note. (Tr.
327, 366, Plaintiffs'Exhibit 1).
Although defendant denied seeing or receiving a copy of either note until
the commencement of plaintiffs' action, on September 12, 1990, approximately six

6

months after the execution of said promissory notes, defendant acknowledged his
$20,000 obligation to plaintiffs in a sworn, written answer to interrogatories.
(Tr. 203-204, 223). Plaintiffs had discussed repayment of the $20,000 owed to
them with both plaintiff and his partner in the printing business, Keith Caldwell, during
which discussions a promise of payment was elicited. (Tr. 307, 308, 336).
At the commencement of this action copies of the two notes were
supplied by plaintiffs to their counsel as exhibits to the complaint. Counsel didn't
become aware until the trial that the addition of payees' names, address and the
typed "Thirteen thousand

" had been added to the copy of the $13,000 note used

as Exhibit 2 to the complaint.

(Tr. 4, 343, 344).

The original $13,000 note,

however, had no such additions. (Exhibit 5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' action was in fact founded on contract, the promise of
defendant to repay the $20,000 to plaintiffs, evidenced by two personally endorsed
checks by defendant, two signed promissory notes by defendant and defendant's
written acknowledgment signed under oath approximately six months following his
signing of the promissory notes. Equitable theory of quantum meruit applies typically
when there is no oral or written contract, not when there are both oral and written
contracts as in the instant case.

7

The sole purpose for plaintiffs' obtaining the written notes signed by
defendant was to secure written evidence of plaintiffs' previous loan to defendant.
The lower court's construction or interpretation of this purpose as improper because
the notes were used to "validate a tax write-off" (Tr. 376) or to deceive the IRS
(Tr. 396, 401), was clearly erroneous. Plaintiffs were entitled to their bad debt writeoff with or without the promissory notes signed by defendant.
Demand for payment is not a prerequisite to filing an action for collection
of a demand note, especially when the written note contains a waiver of demand. A
demand for payment is not legally required for an income tax deduction for a bad debt
or loss.
The appropriate limitation applicable to plaintiffs' cause is §78-12-44,
Utah Code Ann., not the court imposed §78-12-25 which limited improperly plaintiffs'
allowable filing time to four years, rather than the six year limitation to which plaintiffs
are entitled, tolling from the last written and sworn acknowledgment of the debt by
defendant, September 12, 1990.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS' ACTION WAS IN FACT PROPERLY FOUNDED ON
CONTRACT, NOT QUANTUM MERUIT.
Defendant's obligation to pay plaintiff $20,000 was actually found by
the court to be a loan, not a gift. (Tr. 387-389). Inherent in every loan transaction

8

is the promise of the borrower to pay back the sum borrowed. Bankers Mortgage Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C C A . Tex. 142 F.2d 130, 131; First National
Bank of Cordova v. TJOFEVIG. 244 P. 736, 738 (Oregon). Absent that obligation or
promise, a transfer of money would be a gift unsupported by consideration. Initially,
the funds transferred to defendant were evidenced by two personal checks endorsed
only by defendant. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 3).
Later, defendant signed two promissory notes, promising to pay plaintiffs
$7,000 and $13,000, the precise amounts of the previously issued checks, the funds
from which were the consideration received by defendant for his two promissory
notes. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5). Both notes were payable on demand because
no time for payment was stated.

§70A-3-107, U.C.A. (1965). The words, "On

demand", were typed twice on both notes.

The $7,000 note was payable to

plaintiffs, but the $13,000 note was payable to bearer or order because the payee
space was left blank.

State v. Donaldson. 385 P.2d 151 (1963); §70A-3-109,

U.C.A. (1993).
Of very special significance is the fact that defendant made a written
acknowledgment under oath that he owed plaintiffs $20,000 approximately six
months after he signed the promissory notes, which acknowledgment was also many
months after, as he alleged, the plaintiffs' purported statement that they would never
seek payment from defendant. (Tr. 223, 367). The court refused to find fraud in the
9

preparation of the two promissory notes (Tr. 379, 382), which is generally considered
essential to vitiate an integrated written contract. Union Bank v. Swenson.
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
An action based on quantum meruit typically presupposes the existence
of no enforceable written or oral contract. Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d, 264 lUtah
App. 1987); Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc.. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994). In
quantum

meruit, because there is no real contract, equity implies a contract to

prevent unjust enrichment. However, when there is a real contract -- oral or written - as in the instant case, quantum meruit and its equitable remedy do not apply.
Justice is more directly and simply served by enforcement of the existing contract.
POINT II: THE OBTAINING OF WRITTEN PROMISSORY NOTES TO EVIDENCE
AN EXISTING DEBT WHICH HAD BEEN CLAIMED AS A BAD DEBT INCOME TAX
DEDUCTION WERE NOT INVALIDATED BY THE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION CLAIM.
Apparently the court believed the untrue legal conclusion made by
plaintiff, MARY Y. NIELSEN, that she should get notes signed by the defendant
because the plaintiffs' tax deduction "wouldn't be legal otherwise". (Tr. 346-347,
388, 395, 406). The court consequently concluded that the purpose for the notes
was to validate a tax write-off which purpose "would invalidate the promissory
notes." (Tr. 396, 401). However, under the applicable provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code and the regulations pursuant thereto, a deduction for a non-business
bad debt or loss may be taken in the year in which it becomes reasonably certain that

10

there will be no recovery. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, §§ 165-166; Int. Rev. Reg. 1.1651 D2. In the event a recovery should be obtained after the debt write-off, the amount
of the recovery is taxable income to the noteholder who received the recovery.
Legally, therefore, plaintiffs in this action had every right to make the election they
made, especially in light of the fact that the loan was nearly two years old without
payment when the claim was made on their 1989 tax return, March 30, 1990. All
previous loans to defendant had been paid back within two months, not two years.
(Tr. 282).
It was patently false that plaintiffs' deduction of the $20,000 debt from
their 1989 tax return was illegal or was rendered such by their obtaining written notes
merely evidencing and acknowledging defendants pre-existing debt to them. The
lower court resorted to Union Bank v. Swenson. op. cit. supra, to find support for its
finding that plaintiffs' purpose in securing the notes from defendant, who already
owed them $20,000, was improper. In Union Bank the signatories, merely loan
guarantors, owed nothing to the bank prior to their signing the notes as guarantors
of a third party's obligation to the bank. After alleged promises by the loan officer
that they would not be liable for the borrower's debt because their signatures on the
note were merely to satisfy bank examiners, the guarantors signed the note. Later,
when the bank sued the guarantors on the note, they alleged misrepresentation by the
loan officer, raising the question of fraudulent inducement. The Union Bank case
11

gives neither support nor credence to the lower court's finding of an improper
purpose. No fraud was found in the inducement to defendant to sign the promissory
notes in the instant case. (Tr. 379-382).
In contrast to the guarantors in Union Bank the defendant in the instant
case received the $20,000 consideration for the notes he signed as the primary and
only obligor thereunder. His testimony that the plaintiffs had told him the loan would
not have to be paid (Tr. 3 6 1 , 362) appears as a mere fabrication when compared to
his later sworn, written acknowledgment that he owed plaintiffs $20,000. (Tr. 203,
204, 223).

The fabrication becomes even clearer in light of the promise of

defendant's business partner to make payments to plaintiffs on the $20,000 unpaid
loan.

(Tr. 307-308, 336).

Plaintiffs' desire, intent and purpose to evidence an

existing loan obligation by obtaining signed promissory notes by the obligor were
proper, prudent and legal.
POINT III:
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT IS NEITHER A LEGAL PREREQUISITE TO
AN ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF A DEMAND NOTE, NOR FOR AN INCOME TAX
DEDUCTION FOR A BAD DEBT OR LOSS.
The lower court implied that the demand for payment should have been
made by plaintiffs both prior to filing a suit and before electing to deduct the $20,000
loan to defendant as a bad debt or loss. (Tr. 344-345, 385-386). The record reveals,
however, that there was possibly a demand for payment, or at least a discussion of
payment of the notes in question with both defendant and his business partner. (Tr.
12

307-308, 336). Of course in regard to demand notes no demand is legally required
prior to an action for collection. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes § 1033. No note
of any type requires a demand for payment when payment demand is expressly
waived by the written terms of the note as is the case with both notes in the instant
case. Likewise, there is no rule requiring any type or form of demand prior fo an
election by the note holder to claim his note uncollectible. The only test is subjective:
Is it reasonably certain that there will be no recovery? It certainly was certain to
plaintiffs who are still awaiting recovery.
POINT IV: THE SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 78-12-44,
U.C.A., IS THE APPROPRIATE LIMITATION APPLICABLETO PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACT
ACTION.
Even if the lower court's misapplication of the Union Bank case and
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. op. cit. supra, were correct, and the promissory notes
were voided, that doesn't change the type or nature of plaintiffs' cause of action.
Their claim is a legal claim, based on contract. A loan, as the court found (Tr. 387389), includes a promise to repay without which there is no loan or contract. Bankers
Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra. Without the
promise to pay back, a transfer of funds would be a gift; but the lower court
specifically found that there was no gift. (Tr. 387-389). The transaction between
plaintiffs and defendant was a loan, inherent in which is a promise to pay back. This
loan was not created by the promissory notes which were given merely to evidence
13

the pre-existing loan. They didn't validate the loan. It was already valid. They didn't
make it legal. It was already legal. And they didn't extinguish the prior loan as a
judgment does.

They merely confirmed it and extended the time for its legal

collection.
An equitable action in quantum meruit presupposes that there is no
enforceable written or oral contract. Davies v. Olsen. op. cit. supra: Bailev-Allen Co..
Inc.. v. Kurzet. op. cit. supr. The court's citing Yerqensen v. Ford. 402, P2d 696
(Utah 1965) is a misfit of the first order. In Yerqensen a judgment had extinguished
the original claim and a new cause of action, the judgment, was substituted for it.
Consequently, the court ruled that a judgment is not "contract" within the statute
tolling the limitations in case of acknowledgment or part payment in an action founded
upon contract. The instant case was founded upon contract, and the promissory
notes evidencing the original contract did not extinguish the debt.

What the

promissory notes did in fact was extend the limitation by the written acknowledgment
contained in the promissory notes.
The authority of State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems,
894 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1995), does not apply to the instant case because
defendant's written acknowledgments of his debt to plaintiffs were within both the
four year and six year periods of statutory limitation.

No applicable statute of

limitation had expired prior to defendant's written acknowledgments. Plaintiff's cause
14

of action has never been limited by any appropriate statute of limitations. Even if the
original loan tolled from the date of the checks, April 15, 1988, it would not have
been tolled when plaintiffs' action was commenced in 1993 because the written,
sworn acknowledgment by defendant in 1990 would have carried the allowable time
for filing plaintiff's action into the year 1994. At no time has plaintiffs' cause of
action in contract been barred by any appropriate statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision and judgment should be reversed, permitting
plaintiffs to pursue their contract action against defendant which has not yet been
barred by any applicable statute of limitations.
Dated this 1st day of March, 1996.

Williarff,J. Critchlow, III
Attorney for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS were mailed postage pre-paid this / C day of March, 1996, to Brad
C. Smith at 2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300, Ogden, Utah 84401.

Williaffi J. Critchlow, III
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ADDENDA
ADDENDUM 1

Copy of $13,000 check, dated April 15, 1988.

ADDENDUM 2

Copy of $7,000 check, dated April 15, 1988.

ADDENDUM 3

Promissory note for $13,000, dated April 15, 1988.

ADDENDUM 4

Promissory note for $7,000, dated April 15, 1988.

ADDENDUM 5

Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated August 4, 1995.

ADDENDUM 6

Order of Dismissal, dated September 18, 1995.

ADDENDUM 7

Judgment, dated September 18, 1995.
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PUIHTTIFFSEXIJIBfT
EXHIBIT NO.

^

CASE NO.

/LL

DATEREtD
IN EVIDENCE

/'

PROMISSORY NOTE

DATE
/

The undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

at

in

Utah, or at such other place

as the holder may designate in writing, the sum of:
Dollars ($
as follows:

/%

&*&2}% payable

On demand

together, both before and after judgement, with interest on the unpaid balance
thereof from date until paid at the rate of

per cent (

%)

per annum, interest payable as follows: 12,5 percent simple interest. On demand.

Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any
time without penalty.
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the
whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place where the
same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance,
with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder hereof and
without notice of said election at once become due and payable* In event of
any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and severally,
agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney°s fees, legal expenses
and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due hereunder.
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without
notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the release of any
security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.

ADDRESS

3 /

J

y

ADDRESS

This note is secured by

Signature 3*31-90 - on demand

PUWTIFFSEXHlBi
EXHIBIT NO.

_ ^ _

CASINO.
DATE R£C0 / n<T c
ID EVIDENCE A ^
I'

PROMISSORY NOTE

DATE

JJ - /C 19 % $
/

The undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
—

Nelden f .

at

ane\/nr

Mary Y .

MJgUgn

in

Utah, or at such other place

as the holder may designate in writing, the sum of:
Dollars ($ /,/*Q0
as follows:

on

'

)> payable

demand

together, both before and after judgement, with interest on the unpaid balance
thereof from date until paid at the rate of

per cent (

per annum, interest payable as follows: 12.5 percent simple interest.

%)
On demand.

Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any
time without penalty.
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the
whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place where the
same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance,
with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder hereof and
without notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of
any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and severally,
agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney°s fees, legal expenses
and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due hereunder.
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without
notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the release of any
security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.

ADDRESS

•'/ £/rt

rjg&c

ADDRESS

This note is secured by signafnrA

?-?l-?n - on H»m*nH

PLAINTIFFS EXH
EXHIBIT HO.
£
CASE HO.

^

DATEMCD / O *
IK EVIOEUCE — - Z r

r

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DA
STATE OF UTAH
.

NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y.
NIELSEN.
Plaintiffs,

j

iLED IN CLERK'i. O F f . C .

Nteciu^™^
iLEP.K.ZHi-U'.S'. COURT
cue

•.

1

"

DEPUTY c i r r t K

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

V.

Case No. 930700084

PHILIP WARREN,
Defendant.

The Court has reviewed the memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as the exhibits submitted in opposition to said motion.
In addition, the Court has likewise reviewed the other documents on file with the Court.
Having done so, and now being fully advised, it is the Court's conclusion pursuant to Rule 12
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
I

The Court finds that on or about March 22, 1993, Plaintiffs filed a contract

action against Defendant in the Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, seeking
enforcement of two promissory notes in amounts totalling S20,000.00, as well as interest
thereon, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
2.

That on January 25, 1995, the Court held a trial on Plaintiffs' contract action at

which time the Court determined the promissory notes were invalid and unenforceable.
Nevertheless, the Court found that Plaintiffs loaned money to Defendant on or about April 15,
1988 and therefor granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint stating a cause of
action under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit.
3.

That on May 2, 1995, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.
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4.

That on or about May 16, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

basis that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25, which applies to matters of equity..
5.

That the application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 is limited to actions

founded upon contract, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965). In that
case, a judgement had been rendered in an action upon three promissory notes. Following the
judgement, but within the applicable statutory period, the judgement debtors entered into a
written agreement acknowledging the obligation and thereafter made payments on the debt.
Shortly after the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff filed an action and argued that Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-44 tolled the statute as of the date of the acknowledgment, to which the
Court responded that M[w]hereas the common law rule tolls the limitation period in case of an
acknowledgment or part payment in all actions, the foregoing statute restricts it only to those
actions founded upon contract. Yergensen at 399, 697. The Utah Supreme Court thereafter
stated that the proper application of the statute was to a category of assumpsit founded on a
promise, as follows:

The doctrine relating to acknowledgment or part payment applies only to cases
founded upon assumpsit and has no application where the action does not rest
upon a promise. To suspend the operation of the statute, the obligation upon
which the action is based must be founded upon a promise and must not be in
debt or covenant or in actions in effect the same.
id at 399, 698.
An action of assumpsit is "a common-law form of action which allows for recovery of
damages for nonperformance of contract, whether express or implied, written or verbal, as
well as quasi-contractual obligations." Schulz v. Honsador. Inc.. 690 P.2d 279. 281 (Haw.
1984). An action of debt is included in the action of assumpsit and is the appropriate form of
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action to enforce a duty or obligation to pay money. Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St.
Louis. 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (Mo. 1945).
An action in quantum meruit, like an action of debt, is one of the forms of an action
in assumpsit. Laughlin at 979.

The Texas Supreme Court characterized quantum meruit as

"an equitable remedy which does not arise out of contract, but is independent of it." Vortt
Exploration Co.. Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). That court
then further discussed quantum meruit as follows:
Generally, a parry may recover under quantum meruit only when there is no
express contract covering the services or materials furnished. This remedy is
based upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered
and knowingly accepted. Recovery in quantum meruit will be had when nonpayment for the services rendered would result in an unjust enrichment to the
party benefited by the work. IcT at 944.
This Court's findings, particularly number two (2) above, characterizing the payment of
money by Plaintiffs to Defendant as a loan, are consistent with this statement of quantum
meruit

Nevertheless, as noted above, Plaintiffs' action is not properly founded on contract,

thus precluding application of § 78-12-44. Consequently, the statute of limitations has run
on Plaintiffs' cause of action.
Thus, based on the facts and reasons set forth above, the Court hereby grants both
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and request for an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Dated August 4, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

—!erADISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the

(

of August, postage prepaid, to the following:
Brad C. Smith
Attorney at Law
2605 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
David J. Peters
Attorney at Law
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84410
William J. Critchlow, III
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
P.O Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402

^gu~/ firilL-j

Brent M. Burningham
Law Clerk to the Honorable Jon M. Memmott
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B r a d C. Smith, N o . 6656
David S. Kunz, No. 1864
Attorney for Defendant Philip Warren
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WE3ER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y.
NIELSEN,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PHILIP WARREN,

I Civil No. 930700084

Defendant.
Judge Jon M. Memmott
PHILIP WARREN,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
APRILE WARREN,
Third Party Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
came on regularly for hearing on 18 June 1995.

Defendant was not

present in court but was represented by counsel, Brad C. Smith.
Plaintiffs were not present in court but were represented by
counsel, William J. Critchlow, III.

Having reviewed the

pleadings on file and having heard the arguments and
representations of counsel, the Court issued a Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which held that Defendant's Motion
to Dis-miss was granted.
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Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
The Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
as it is time-barred.
The Defendant is awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and
costs incurred in the Motion to Dismiss, which fees and
costs may be established by his attorney's affidavit.
DATED this

^ ^ a y of SaftX -

, 1995.

District Court Judge
RULE 4-504 NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing ORDER
OF DISMISSAL to Judge Jon M. Memmott of the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, for signature upon the expiration
21
of EIGHT days from 3 ^ August 1995, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time.

BRAD C. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing Order of Dismissal, this 2-(
day of August, 1995,
to William R. Critchlow III, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 2610
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401 and David J. Peters 505
South Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David S. Kunz, No. 1864
Attorney for Defendant Philip Warren
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-4573

£E"UTYCLERK

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y.
NIELSEN,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

vs.
PHILIP WARREN,

Civil No. 930700084

Defendant.
Judge Jon M. Memmott
PHILIP WARREN,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
APRILE WARREN,
Third Party Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
came on regularly for hearing on 18 June 1995.

Defendant was not

present in court but was represented by counsel, Brad C. Smith.
Plaintiffs were not present in court but were represented by
counsel, William J. Critchlow, III.

Having reviewed the

pleadings on file and having heard the arguments and
representations of counsel, the Court issued a Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which held that Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss was granted,
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Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
Plaintiffs/ Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
Defendant is awarded the sum of $850.00 for attorneys fees
together with $372.50 in costs from Plaintiffs', jointly and
severally, together with his costs and interest at the
lawful rate until paid and it is further ordered that this
judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable
costs and attorneys fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established
by affidavit.
DATED this 1 8 ^ day of SoXTT -

frv\
-JDistrict
:ict 'Court
Court

, 1995.

Judge
Judge

RULE 4-504 NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing ORDER
OF DISMISSAL to Judge Jon M. Memmott of the Second Judicial
District Court of Davis County, for signature upon the expiration
of EIGHT days from S^August 1995, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time.

P^^Jj^^^^c^
BRAD C. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing Order of Dismissal, this 2~/
day of August, 1995,
to William R. Critchlow III, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 2610
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401 and David J. Peters 505
South Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
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